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The United States Navy has solicited proposals for a
revolutionary class of ship, the Arsenal Ship. Despite
reduced funding for the project, the concept is still
viable for future development . We show how the development
of a new unparalleled weapon system or platform will evoke
a response by potential adversaries, based on capabilities
and asset investment, by unconventional means. The Arsenal
Ship is a formidable threat, yet is vulnerable relative to
other high value units. These reasons make it an inviting
target across the spectrum of conflict. This thesis will
describe threats that are usually overlooked and examine
the Arsenal Ship's vulnerability to them. In addition, we
will show how these vulnerabilities arise as the Arsenal
Ship operates through the range of geographic areas.
Further, this thesis describes possible strategic and
tactical defensive actions to enable the Arsenal Ship to
counter these unconventional threats. Each recommended
action has a direct implication upon the engineered design
and the proposed Concept of Operations (CONOP) . In
addition, the recommendations will influence the strategy
for employing any future platform based on the Arsenal Ship
concept, anywhere in the world.
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For any new and innovative weapon system or platform,
the question of capabilities versus vulnerabilities are
always at the forefront of discussion. This thesis will
address critical vulnerabilities to special operations
targeting that the Arsenal Ship concept and development has
left unattended. Chapter II will define the proposed
"concept of operations" (CONOPS) and physical design
considerations of the Arsenal Ship (ARSHIP) . This will
then lead into the proposed role that the ARSHIP will hold
in American foreign policy. Chapter II also defines the
terminology of "special operations", as it will be used
academically in our thesis. That chapter will also
introduce the reader to the military and political utility
of special operations. This will evolve into a discussion
of why states would conduct special operations in lieu of,
or to augment general -purpose forces. This will illustrate
the attractiveness of the ARSHIP as a target for special
operations
.
Chapter III will categorize the outcomes that
potential threats might attempt to achieve. These
categories, coupled with the dissimilar geographic areas
where the ARSHIP faces different defense challenges, will
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be used to show the potential threats that the ARSHIP will
face. From this, a comprehensive list of possible courses
of action that can threaten the ARSHIP will be compiled.
After a brief description of each attack mode, factors that
affect the defense of the ARSHIP will be discussed. This
will lay the groundwork to demonstrate how special
operations can effectively circumvent traditional defensive
measures and achieve the previously described mission
objectives
.
Chapter IV will be an in-depth analysis of five
special operations courses-of-action that are, in the case
of the ARSHIP, more predominant and highly potent. The in-
depth analysis will describe the characteristics of
ingress /egress and actions at the objective. These will be
described as modes of action and objectives of action.
Chapter IV will further discuss the mitigating factors that
affect the effectiveness of the aggressor and the defense
of the ARSHIP. By understanding the interplay between the
two, defense options will be formulated.
Chapter V will address possible strategic and tactical
defense options that should be implemented for the ARSHIP.
The defense options are formulated with unconventional
threats in mind, but their value against conventional
attacks should not be discounted. Most of the strategic
measures are to dissuade an adversary from conducting an
unconventional attack through deterrence and deception.
The proposed defense options will have an effect on the
engineering design, the proposed CONOPS, and the strategy
utilized in the future employment of the ARSHIP concept.
This thesis was initiated prior to the formal decrease
in funding of the ARSHIP concept. Its initial intent was
to become an integral part of the iterative process of
refining the ARSHIP' s CONOPS and physical design. We have
continued its pursuit based on the importance of educating
future planners and designers who might propose similar
concepts of a large, highly automated and low manned
warship.

II. THE ARSHIP AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS
A. THE ARSENAL SHIP
The ARSHIP is a proposed U.S. naval warship that can
be loaded with 500 missiles in a vertical launch system
(VLS) . The payload of missiles can be a combination of
cruise and/or anti-air missiles. They will be able to
receive targeting data and launched either from onboard the
ARSHIP or remotely from another platform. The missiles
will be used for theater missile defense (TMD) , anti-air
warfare (AAW) , and deep strike operations. Ideally, the
mission of the ARSHIP concept is for the vessel to be
positioned within its weapons' range to an adversary and
act as a tool for U.S. coercive diplomacy.
The ARSHIP will be a technologically advanced ship,
designed to operate with a reduced crew of less than 50.
The vessel's size will be approximately the length of two
football fields and have a sustained maximum speed of 22
knots. Full automation and redundant networking will
eliminate system failures with every system onboard. The
command and control system will be fully integrated and
utilize the most advanced technology available. Even
damage control (DC) sensors and actions will be automated.
Proposed CONOPS scenarios have the ARSHIP out to sea
for extended periods of time and it will either deploy as a
stand-alone platform or be accompanied by a conventional
surface combatant. To operate alone, the ARSHIP will rely
on its stealth design for concealment. It will not be
equipped with self-defense weapons systems. Along with its
low visual profile, the technological features of its
stealth design will reduce its electromagnetic and
acoustical transmissions. Defense of the ARSHIP depends on
the success of these technological advances to conceal its
location and allow it to operate freely under this cloak of
invisibility. Another CONOPS proposal is to have an
unmanned version of the ARSHIP controlled by electronic
tether from another ship operating within line of sight
(LOS)
.
B. UNDERSTANDING THE ARSHIP 'S ROLE
The ARSHIP will, herein, be described on two levels.
First as a weapons platform, that is deployable and moves
the system of weapons from geographic region to region.
Secondly as a weapon system that fires missiles, commanded
either remotely or locally, projecting power ashore. The
ARSHIP can be likened to a ballistic missile submarine, a
weapon system by design as well as a deployable platform.
This distinction will lead to the understanding that this
new ship is an important new target, different in critical
ways from other surface combatants. This will increase the
range and importance of threats that the ARSHIP will
encounter.
The ARSHIP will be capable of delivering an
unparalleled level of distant precise destruction. This
potential destruction is a step change in current
capabilities which is unrivaled by its conventional peers.
Some refer to it as a capital ship while others view it
merely as a floating ammunition barge. Regardless of the
proponents ' /opponents ' views, the bottom line is that it
will have unparalleled influences on U.S. foreign policy
because it is a means for exacting unsurpassed tolls on an
enemy's infrastructure and military capability. This
places many of the U.S.' conventional competitors at a
disadvantage and position of asymmetrical weakness.
Consequently, this new ship warrants an opponent's
heightened attention across the spectrum of conflict.
C. DEFINITION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS
Scholars have debated the definition of special
operations, developing definitions that primarily assist
their own theories. The common denominators of many of
these definitions boil down to three basic characteristics.
Special operations are militaristic operations that are:
1) small in scale; 2) planned to have the effect of high
leverage; and 3) unorthodox. 1 The usefulness of this
definition is in its universal applicability beyond the
narrow paradigm of Western thought.
Each characteristic must be present to distinguish a
militaristic operation as a special operation in the
context of war and politics. The first condition, small in
scale, separates a special operation from an unconventional
operation carried out in the conduct of maneuver warfare,
such as an airborne assault, or amphibious landing. The
second condition is that the operation is designed and has
the potential to impose an effect much larger than its
investment. Inherent in the condition of high leverage is
that this effect is a product of planning and not of
happenstance. Finally, no special operation would be
"special" if it wasn't different from the main stream of
tactics in the context of the conflict. Ergo, a special
operation must be unorthodox.
Who conducts special operations? In an attempt to
enlighten the reader to special operations, a comprehensive
list of potential actors that are available to any group,
organization, or state to conduct a special operation has
1
Arquilla, John, Editor, From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modem Times,
University Press of America, Inc., 1996.
been established. First, there are elite state-sponsored
military units that are highly trained in conducting small
unit tactics that fill a void that general-purpose forces
cannot. Secondly, trained militia and mercenary groups
that are for hire throughout the world are recognized.
These mercenaries are, in their own way, elite units based
on special training and recruitment. Thirdly, organized
crime and terrorist organizations that may be solicited or
coerced into working on behalf of a group or state are
prime candidates for conducting special operations.
Fourth, is the inclusion of any civilian who is a resource
and can be commissioned or politicized to organize or act
in proxy for a state in the conduct of special operations.
Lastly, is the admission that general-purpose forces, when
utilized in a definitive manner can also execute special
operations. This chapter will conclude with the answer to
why a power would conduct a special operation.
D. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS
In the decision to conduct a special operation, a
question arises: To what extent do external and internal
constraints and opportunities shape the relative advantages
of conducting special operations in lieu of conventional
operations. To attempt to understand the decision-making
process between the two, we propose the use of two concepts
of utility, simple cost-benefit analysis and our concept of
singularity. Singularity occurs when there is only one
option available or capable of achieving a specific goal.
Utility theory is an intricate weighing of costs and
benefits in the context of the decision-maker's philosophy
as well as relative resource levels. Context plays a key
role in all levels of this method of analysis. Each level
is dependent on current capabilities and resource levels.
Utility theory is applicable in the concept of military and
political decision-making and operational selection. These
two concepts are deliberately and subconsciously utilized
when making decisions. Cost-benefit analysis can be
carried out on many levels: politically, socially,
militarily, and economically.
The first level of operation selection is the military
level of cost-benefit analysis. The key resources of any
military are funding, personnel, high value assets, and
equipment. On the cost-benefit scale of personnel
investment, a special operation tilts the balance in its
favor over conventional applications of force. This
pertains to the size of the operation and the advantage of
investing small numbers to achieve large effects.
Considering the investment of high value assets such as
aircraft, ships, or submarines in support of a special
10
operation is also an important issue. This is where much
of the potential deliberation is carried out. The threat
of loosing a high value asset in order to carry out a small
operation is measured against the expected outcome. For
example, due to the number of helicopters that the U.S. had
in inventory, the investment of helicopters in Desert One
was a minimal factor based on the mission's possible
success or failure. On the other hand, placing a SSN/SSBN
into harms way in order to insert a special operation force
could be seen as a risk not worth the best outcome.
The second level of operational selection via cost-
benefit analysis is the political level. There are two
identifiable constraints faced by a state or organization
at this level, internal and external. Internal constraints
apply to a state's constituency's responses to executing a
special operation. The methods of execution, the expected
and resultant outcomes, and the appropriateness of the
operation are key perceptions that are analyzed by these
audiences . External measures apply to the international
response to special operations. These two measures are
political and social in nature. This is to say that
although a state may utilize a special operation to achieve
a political goal, the world population has a voice beyond
simple representative politics. This voice can be heard
11
through product boycotts, demonstrations, and direct
terrorist actions. Political ramifications, intended and
unintended, take many forms ranging from political
isolation in the international community to military action
by coalition governments. These measures illustrate the
highest gains and losses that a state can achieve or suffer
in the arena of international relations.
The third level of analysis is the economic level
.
This takes into account the cost and availability of
assets, rather than the operational and strategic value of
assets. Economics can decide how much of an investment a
group or state is willing to put into equipping a standing
army with armored vehicles, tanks, aircraft, and large
ships. Special operations forces require only a small
percentage of the funding needed for a standing army.
However, the bottom line with regard to economics is still
the military effectiveness of the armed forces that a state
is willing to build and sustain.
Singularity is distinguished by the uniqueness of an
operation relative to other available means. Levels of
uniqueness are based on the congruence between internal and
external constraints and the ability of the forces to
conduct the mission within those boundaries. The
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employer's specifications or the situation's demands are
seemingly less tangible. These characteristics of
uniqueness qualify an operation as a singular option when
it is the only available method of high precision,
surprise, speed, relative size, survivability, non-
attribution, or success. The ability of a force to "fit"
such a tightly constrained operation is characteristic of
special operations.
Constraints can be categorized as internal or
external. Internally, there are "rules of engagement"
(ROE), "commander's intent" along with "specified and
implied tasks" that dictate the uniqueness of forces and
operational method selected. For example, a power may want
to abduct a high-ranking official without causing any
large-scale damage, without occupying terrain, all within a
specific time period. There is little cost-benefit
analysis applied in this decision process, especially in
those states or organizations that have standing trained
special operations forces. The specified uniqueness called
for in this case results in only one option for strategic
personnel extraction, a small covert force.
Externally, the defense posture of the opponent, the
weather, the terrain, and the timeliness or urgency of an
operation can dictate the necessary uniqueness of the
13
operations selected. For example, an opponent that is
heavily fortified may let down his guard in the perception
of friendly or neutral activity in the area. This would
apply well in commercial fishing areas where navies and
coastal patrols are active. A special operation may
utilize commercial or leisure craft to navigate undetected
in plain sight to execute their mission. Further examples
can be extended to those trained forces that are
comfortable operating in challenging weather elements.
Darkness, fog, wind, and high sea states may be deemed too
dangerous for operations to be conducted by general-purpose
forces. There are external constraints that allow a force
or course of action to be the only possible choice. Some
of these include the probability of surprise, success, and
survivabi 1 i ty
.
These characteristics of singularity are more
pronounced at the higher levels of operational and
strategic force employment. This is apparent due to the
high leverage that can be brought to bear by a special
operation. Additionally, singularity establishes a niche
for special operations in the most politicized form of
warfare, the use of special force in executing foreign
policy. This is considered the highest form of strategic
utility.
14
Applying this chapter's methodology for classification
and understanding the utility of operations, will assist in
understanding the objectives, and therefore the ways and
means of conducting special operations against the U.S.'
new attempt at high technology, the ARSHIP.
15
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III. POTENTIAL THREATS FACING THE ARSHIP
Having established the ARSHIP 's position as an
instrument of United States foreign policy and using
defined terminology and methodology as points of departure,
this chapter describes potential courses of action that the
enemy can use to counter the ARSHIP.
The first section in this chapter proposes that there
are five distinct categories of aggressive objectives that
would mitigate the effectiveness of the ARSHIP. These
objectives will define which courses of action the
adversary may take against the ARSHIP. Resultant is a
comprehensive list of these courses of action. This
chapter then briefly reviews their objectives and potential
for employment and success. This comprehensive list will
be reduced in Chapter V to only include courses of action
that are special operations and the shortened list will be
examined in detail. Concluding the chapter is a discussion
of mitigating factors that assist or hamper the success of
the special operation being conducted. Chapter V will also
utilize these factors to critically review the shortened
list of courses of action and the defensive ability of the
ARSHIP.
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A. ENDS OF THE THREATS
Objectives of combating the effectiveness of the
ARSHIP are categorized into five possible categories.
These five objective assist in defining the possible
courses of action (COA) that a state or group may take
against the ARSHIP. They are:
1. Kill the ARSHIP
2. Control or displace its geo-location beyond its
weapons ' range
3 . Reduce the rate of fire
4. Reduce the probability of hit
5. Reduce the effect of hits
The first category, kill the ARSHIP, is self-
explanatory. It means the permanent effect of sinking the
ship or destroying critical .components of the ARSHIP 's
structure that cannot be shored up or replaced. There are
no variable intensities of this objective category. Terms
such as 'soft kill' will not apply to this category.
Effects such as temporarily effecting maneuver and firing
will fall under other categories.
The second category, control or displace the ARSHIP 's
geo-location beyond its weapons' range, is a temporary
effect that can be broken into gradations of success based
18
on the attacker's conflict requirements. This category
includes a wide variety of actions. Possible COA include:
1. Piracy, seizure, and hostage








a Threat based maneuver
b. Propulsion damage
c Structural damage
The third category, reduce the rate of fire of the
ARSHIP's missiles, is again one with degrees of
effectiveness. Reducing the rate of fire can be described
as reducing to a zero rate of fire, simply reducing the
rate below a certain threshold, or reducing the rate from
the ominous possibility of near simultaneous launch of 500
missiles at different targets. Potential methods of
achieving these goals include but are not limited to:
1. Distraction: To harass the crew or defense escorts
forcing
a. maneuver rather than fire control
b. damage control rather than fire control
c. defense rather than fire control
2. Disruption: To act to disrupt the fire control
system that is dependent on automation
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a. disrupt its external communications
b. disrupt its internal fire control
c. disrupt its use of mechanical VLS
The last set of disruption points identifies critical
nodes rather than courses of action.
To achieve a reduced probability of hit, an adversary-
can effect the ARSHIP or the potential target set. Doing
this, the adversary can take preventative, preemptive or
reactive measures. Actions the adversary can take
regarding the potential target set includes but is not
limited to:
1. making critical nodes mobile




utilizing false targets to draw fire from real
targets
Actions an adversary can take proactively toward the
ARSHIP to attempt to effect the probability of a hit
include but are not limited to:
1. disrupting targeting communications data stream
2
.
replace the targeting communications data stream
3 taking control of onboard guidance systems
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Reducing the effectiveness of the hit of a missile is
purely a preventive measure. This would include target
hardening with concrete, tunnels, and bunkers.
B. MEANS OF POSING A THREAT
1. Medium Considerations
An adversary can attack a target through one or a
combination of five mediums, air, land, sea, space, and the
electromagnetic spectrum. Air, land and sea are the main
mediums in which these actors can attempt to operate
directly against the ARSHIP. The categories of space and
the electromagnetic spectrum indirectly affect the ARSHIP,
mostly in the realm of sensors and communications.
2. Methods of Approach
Each of the three primary mediums (air, sea, and land)
can be used for direct physical attack. Attacks in a
number of different ways including sub-surface, maritime
and terrestrial surfaces, and air attacks. Sub-surface
attacks are delivered from below the surface of the water.
This makes visual and electronic detection and defense more
challenging. Electronic detection depends on environmental
conditions and capability of the equipment and individuals
manning it. Without a means to visually detect the
underwater threat; such as air bubbles, water turbulence,
or any other factor associated with the attackers'
21
movement; their approach will proceed without warning and
catch the vessel by surprise and unprepared to defend the
attack.
Maritime surface threats may be easier than sub-
surface threats to detect, but they are serious enough to
raise concern. The surface contact must be detected and
assessed before it is perceived as a hostile threat. A
small fishing vessel may be perceived as innocently
proceeding about its job when its true intention is to
close on the ARSHIP and attack it. The ability to discern
between innocent and aggressive movement requires personal
and professional judgment before reporting it. This delay
in reporting gives the attackers additional time to
accomplish their desired intention.
Electronically, discrimination between land and
threatening contacts on land is nearly impossible for a
maritime vessel. Visual detection of a threat is limited
to the range and bearing of vision from an individual's
vantage point . Land areas located near waterway and around
harbors are usually highly populated. Clutter associated
with urbanization, such as buildings and vehicles, can be
advantageous to an attacker. Projectiles can be launched
from land units as well as an assault force, when the ship
is tied to a pier.
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Air attacks are not limited to certain lanes of
approach. An air attack can come from any direction. This
requires 360-degree, 3-dimensional surveillance for
detection. Another advantage is that higher speeds can be
achieved during an approach than in the other types of
attacks. Lower speed approach can also be an advantage to
the attacker. Physically, they can fly below the detection
equipment's operating azimuth caused by the earth's
curvature. Additionally, the equipment may not classify a
contact as hostile when aircraft approach below the
automated parameters of the search system. Much like the
threat of falsely perceived innocence of maritime surface
threats, aircraft can proceed along established commercial
air corridors then diverting quickly to threaten the
ARSHIP.
3 . Geographic Considerations
By choosing which outcome best fits their strategy,
the adversary will choose the best time and place for their
attack. The tactics which potential adversaries will
utilize to pursue the ARSHIP will be guided by its
location. Any ship has vulnerabilities whether inport or
at sea. However, the ARSHIP 's reduced crew size, CONOPS
and streamlined topside are factors that make it more
vulnerable than most other surface combatants. Therefore,
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our analysis of the ARSHIP will be shaped according to the
geographic areas of vulnerability, categorized as import,
open ocean, and confined water.
Inport is the area located along a waterway or harbor
near a land facility where the vessel is tied to a pier or
anchored in the harbor. Factors associated with a vessel
inport are its positioning and defense posture. At anchor
or pierside, the vessel is relatively stationary and cannot
get underway without proper engineering preparation.
Without prior threat warning, the vessel's defense posture
is usually at a lower state than if at sea or operating in
the vicinity of known threats. For example, a ship inport
does not have the necessary equipment operating to detect
attack and must rely on sailors working and posted about
the deck to observe threatening intentions from an
adversary. Inport protection and readiness are usually
less than when underway.
Open ocean is the operation area that is devoid of
land, shallow water, miscellaneous high volume shipping
traffic, and other types of hazards to navigation. In open
ocean, a vessel can maneuver freely and unimpeded. In
addition, the crewmembers are active and the defense
posture is higher. All vital equipment is properly manned
and operating.
24
Confined water is an area where a vessel is restricted
in its ability to maneuver while transiting or operating in
the vicinity of littoral waters in which there is
"clutter." Clutter is the presence of other vessels, land,
shallow water, oil rigs, air traffic, electromagnetic
traffic, and other obstacles that become too numerous to
track. In confined water, the ability to discern friendly
from hostile contacts is challenged. The defense posture
is higher compared to inport, but some radiating equipment
may not be allowed to operate due to the close proximity to
land. Additionally, individuals that normally man
detection sensors may be conducting other duties such as
"sea and anchor detail."
C. INITIAL LIST OF POSSIBLE THREATS
Having already addressed where and how a threat will
be used, our thesis will now develop a comprehensive list
of possible threats. A warship is the weapon platform that
carries the weapon system, such as a missile system. The
missile system includes all associated tracking and firing
equipment as well as the weapon, the missile itself. The
missile is used to directly destroy the target.
The threats to the ARSHIP are limited only to the
adversaries' imagination and ability to carry them out.
Table 1 illustrates our list of the entire spectrum of
25
possible threats. These potential threats are grouped
according to their means of attack. The geographic areas
of vulnerability are used to discern which threats are
capable of operating against the ARSHIP in that arena.





Manned Torpedo X A A
Mines X X
Sub- surface/Surface (M)
Combat swimmer X A A
Surface (Maritime)
Small Boats
Recreational /Leisure X X
Combat Raiding Craft X A X
Other Small Craft X A X
Surface (Both Maritime and
Terrestrial)
Assault Force X A A
Gunfire X A X
Air
Helicopter X A X
Planes
Ultralite X A X
Glider X A X
RPV X A X
Private /Commercial X X X
Parachute X
Missile Attack X A X
X = no assistance from additional weapon platform required.
A = assistance from additional weapon platform (aircraft or
vessel) required.
larger
Table 1. Comprehensive Listing of Threats to the ARSHIP
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1 . Submarine
Submarines, due to their size and maneuvering
constraints, are assets that are restricted to movements in
more open and deeper waters. Their undetected approach is
impossible in all but deep-water ports and is, therefore,
suited to open ocean or confined water attacks. As a
weapon system, the submarine can directly attack the ARSHIP
by using torpedoes, the goal being to sink the vessel or
render it unable to maneuver and/or perform its mission.
In confined water, the submarine's ability to discriminate
between the ARSHIP and surrounding contacts is a problem it
must overcome. The submarine can be used as a weapon
platform for other types of attack. Combat swimmers and
small inflatable boats can be "locked out" of a submarine
at depth or deployed while on the surface. The submarine
then is an ingress/egress platform for these courses of
action.
2. Mini-Sub
A form of submarine that is suited for inport attack
is the mini-sub. This smaller version can operate in
shallow water, approach a target virtually undetected, and
severely damage a target.
Similar to the submarine, the mini-sub is operated by
highly trained personnel and therefore, is limited in its
27
use by States that have the necessary resources. The U.S.
Navy SEALs operate a mini sub, the Swimmer Deliver Vehicle
(SDV) , as do the countries such as Britain, Bahrain, and
most notably North Korea. Recent press releases have
demonstrated the North Korean's willingness to use the
mini-sub for ingress into South Korea.
3 . Manned Torpedo
Like the mini-sub, a manned torpedo can operate
inport, and confined water. As a weapon, the manned
torpedo is similar to a conventional torpedo with the
exception that guidance requires a human pilot to align it
with the target. The pilot can either eject or ride it
until contact with the target and detonation. Many
terrorist groups are more than willing to undertake a
suicide mission in order to achieve a desired goal. The
pilots of the manned torpedo must be properly trained in
the skills required to breathe compressed air and to
navigate underwater. This will eliminate many smaller,
unsophisticated countries and organizations.
4 . Mines
Any country or organization can procure and deploy a
mine. Mines can float on or below the surface or dwell on
the bottom. Sub-surface mines are virtually visually
undetectable. Most mines do not have guidance systems to
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direct them to a desired target. However, smart mines can
detonate on certain specific gravities of metal hulls, on
certain acoustical signatures, on a specific number of
repetitions of either occurrence, and upon command. A
general-purpose mine must rely on physical contact to
trigger detonation. Neither general-purpose mines nor
smart mines are precision strike weapons unless they are in
the vicinity of a desired target and command detonated.
5 . Combat Swimmer
A sub-surface or surface threat of a combat swimmer
can range from a single swimmer to a group working together
as a team. The ARSHIP must be immobile to conduct such an
operation due to the fact that the maximum speed of swimmer
is 2 knots. To function as a weapon, the combat swimmer
can attempt to strap explosive to his body and conduct a
suicide mission against the ARSHIP. As a weapon system,
the swimmer or team's goal can be to attach an explosive
charge to the ship's submerged structures or climb aboard.
A team has a better chance of neutralizing the crew in
order to control the vessel and its payload.
The process of swimming or diving may also be used as
ingress /egress methods to reach land or another vessel
before conducting an attack. In addition, the adversary
approaching on the surface is easier to detect than if
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submerged. The Viet Cong demonstrated the ability to
conduct combat swimmer operations in the Mekong Delta
during the Vietnam War. Examples of current elite units
are the U.S. Navy SEAL units and the German Kampfswimmers
.
6. Small Boats
Boat attacks can be from commercial boats,
recreational/leisure craft, combat raiding craft, and other
small craft. These types of boats are relatively
inexpensive, need little training to operate, and are
common throughout the world. Any group or organization
whether state sponsored or acting independently can use
small boats. A boat can act as a weapon by being loaded
with explosives and ram the ARSHIP. A suicide mission like
this can be effective and most likely used inport or in
confined water.
A small boat can appear innocent and approach very
close to a vessel without raising alarm. This ability can
be used not only to conceal its deployment as a weapon, but
assist it as a weapon system and platform. In the role of
a weapon system, a small boat will likely carry armament
that will be used to directly attack the ARSHIP. As a
weapon platform, a small boat can deliver an assault force
to the ARSHIP or insert combat swimmers in the vicinity of
their target.
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7 . Assault Force
An assault is when the adversary attacks the ARSHIP
with intentions of boarding. Their access can be gained
via land, sea, or air. The force can be stationed on land
or they can reach it from the sea or air by utilizing a
delivery platform. To exploit the option of a land
assault, the ARSHIP must be inport and tied to a pier. The
terrestrial assaulting force can get onboard by way of the
brow, mooring lines, ladders or leap onboard. In open
ocean or confined water, an ingress method must be used to
deliver an assault team to the vessel.
Once they have successfully gained access, they can
perform their desired mission. If used as a weapon, the
assault may take the form of a suicide bomber that has
explosives attached to their body. The assault force,
acting as a weapon system, can also place explosive charges
in specific locations to damage or destroy vital equipment.
The force's objective may be the crew. By controlling or
eliminating the crew, the assault force gains command over
the vessel and its payload.
The assaulting force's training required depends on
the mission and the desired result. Any untrained
individual can conduct a suicide bombing. An intricate
plan to access the ARSHIP and place explosives on vital
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equipment or neutralize the crew requires a highly trained
force. The training must focus on coordination and
knowledge of the target. Many possible methods of ingress
may require additional specific training against the
ARSHIP's characteristics. The assault force tactic by its
complex nature may require elite forces to ensure some
degree of success. Recalling who conducts special
operations , these forces are; elite military units, trained
mercenaries, or organized pirate groups (criminal).
8. Gunfire
Gunfire can come from artillery and other larger
caliber weapons positioned on land or from a weapon
platform at sea. Gunfire requires targeting information
for accuracy. It can have a range from hundreds of yards
to several miles depending on the caliber and design. The
gunfire can be used to destroy equipment and render the
vessel unable to conduct intended missions. Many states
and organizations possess the ability to procure and fire
large caliber weapons. Therefore, the use of gunfire is a
threat option that can be used by any adversary.
9 . Aircraft
There are a number of different types of aircraft that
can pose threats to the ARSHIP including helicopters,
airplanes, ultralites, RPVs , and gliders. A helicopter, by
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flying low and slow, can go undetected by automated
electronic sensors. Once close to target, a helicopter
loaded with explosives can be a weapon used to impact into
the target. As a weapon system, the helicopter can attack
the ARSHIP's topside equipment with guns or missiles. It
can also be used as an ingress and egress platform to
deliver combat swimmers, small boats and personnel into the
water within range of the ARSHIP, or an assault force to
the deck of the target in order to accomplish the
adversary's goal.
The operating range and speed of an airplane makes it
a threat to the ARSHIP across all geographic areas.
However, smaller types of planes need to operate closer to
land. Loaded with explosives, the aircraft can become a
guided warhead. Private or commercial planes may seem
unthreatening if operating along normal air traffic
patterns. Therefore, their ability to not draw attention
as a threat can be used to approach the target.
The airplane may also perform as a weapon system. A
plane can be used to drop bombs or launch missiles. For
ingress, the airplane, as a weapon platform can deliver an
assault force. The cost and skill required to procure and
train pilots depend on the type of aircraft being used. An
ultralite, glider, or RPV require little, while a
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helicopters and private or commercial airplanes need more
training and funding to maintain and operate. These
factors make it likely that any organization or state can
utilize an air threat.
10 . Parachute
Utilizing the helicopter or airplane as a platform,
parachute operations can be used only as an ingress method.
The parachute can deliver an assault force to the land,
water, or directly on the vessel. Due to the difficulty
associated with attempting to land a parachutist on a
moving target, parachute operations require a nearly
stationary platform,
.
limiting the parachute assaults to
only when the ARSHIP is inport. In addition, the parachute
can be used to deliver boats into the vicinity of the
target to attack a vessel operating at long ranges from
land. Once onboard the team operates as if delivered from
any one of the other mentioned delivery methods. To
conduct such an operation, minimal training is required.
Parachute training is available from any source and does
not need to take place in a formal military environment.
11. Missile Attack
Launched from a weapon platform or launched from a
land site, a missile attack utilizes the assistance of a
rocket or turbofan motor as a means to deliver a
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destructive warhead to the target. Missile range
determines the need for a weapon platform to approach
within its range in order to be effective. As a weapon,
the missile can have internal targeting and navigational
systems or it may require external inputs for terminal
guidance. Either method relies on the ability of the
adversary to properly target the ARSHIP in order to assure
a direct hit. Like guided bombs, missiles would rely on a
guidance system for terminal guidance. A missile's radar
would be defeated by the ARSHIP' s stealth qualities. A
sophisticated and advanced missile is expensive to obtain
and like all high priority intelligence keys, will be
tracked at higher government levels. Another possible
missile threat is a hand held missile system and
intelligence sources are important in providing possible
warnings of their procurement and use by non-state groups
and organizations. Other types of projectiles, which are
harder to track, are rocket propelled grenades (RPG) and
recoilless rifles, which could be considered as a missile
threat when, launched from a proximate platform.
D. MITIGATING FACTORS
1. Aggressor's Personnel and Equipment
There are mitigating factors that affect the defense
of the ARSHIP to these threats. They are the limitations
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of an aggressor's personnel and equipment, the environment,
and the constraints of a defensive posture for the target
vessel
.
Physical limitations of the aggressive personnel and
the equipment employed characterize the one mitigating
factor category. Personnel considerations are considered
mortal in nature. They depend on physical conditioning,
physical exposure to the elements and hazards to life. To
execute an attack, the individuals assigned the task must
have the ability to successfully complete it. The physical
demands of swimming, diving, boating, packing or running
extended distances require physically fit individuals. As
seen with a combat swimmer or air threat, the proper
equipment is required along with associated training to
operate it. The equipment may be expensive, possess
advanced technology. The ability of an adversary to
possess, maintain, and operate some types of equipment may
not feasibly be within their means. The equipment alone
will not make an attack succeed, but its utilization by a
properly trained individual make it an asset.
2 . Environment
The next factor associated with a threat's
effectiveness is the environment. Environmental
considerations include illumination, weather, and medium
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characteristics. Elite units train in harsh conditions so
as not to be limited by their constraints. However, there
are still environmental properties that will always
adversely effect humans and equipment.
With respect to illumination, the time of day or night
has an influence on the threat's ability to succeed
undetected. Additionally, during the day, crewmembers on
the intended target are more likely to be alert and
responsive to multiple threats. Darkness can completely
conceal the approach of an adversary or severely impair the
target's ability to detect several threats. The
adversary's ability to operate without the aid of
illumination also requires coordination, training, and
additional equipment such as night vision devices. The
ability to attack at night falls into the realm of special
military elite units but does not exclude others from
operating in it.
Weather includes visibility issues, sea state, and
high winds. The factors affiliated with weather affect
both the attacker and target. For every positive effect
associated with it, weather has a counter effect that may
provide addition obstacles to overcome. Visibility is
diminished with the addition of precipitation such as rain,
fog, or snow. Precipitation can degrade the ARSHIP's use
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of radar, visual sightings, and other forms of detection
for defense. While it conceals their approach, the
attacker must be able to discriminate between the target
and other unimportant contacts in order to succeed.
In addition to precipitation, sea state is adversely-
affected by bad weather. A higher sea state makes tasks
such as small boat employment and surface combat swimmer
more laborious and difficult. The sea state can also
assist the stealth technology of the ARSHIP, by providing
more 'noise' to passive and active electronic sensors.
High winds increase sea state, but are not necessary to
produce higher sea states. Additionally, higher wind speed
can oppose the adversary's use of small aircraft and the
parachute. An ultralite, glider, or RPV also, may not be
able to operate under these circumstances.
The characteristics of the medium in which the
attacker must transit to reach the target are ambient
temperature, and ecological activity. Cold temperature can
adversely affect an individual when exposed for prolonged
periods. Hypothermia in cold water and frostbite in cold
air are results of extended exposure. In addition, cold
temperature can dull the senses and delay reaction time.
Protection from extreme weather is required for anyone
wanting to operate under these conditions. Bioluminescence
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can expose the approach of a submerged combat swimmer,
mini-sub, or small boat and alert the target. Wildlife may
use the approaching medium as a habitat area and their
disturbance can result in a commotion that the target can
detect. An example would be an assault force approaching
over land that startles a flock of birds on the ground,
announcing their presence.
3 . Constraints of a Defensive Posture
The defensive posture of the ARSHIP will greatly
affect the likelihood of a successful attack. Defensive
posture is characterized by the readiness of the crew and
vessel, the current position, speed of advance and assigned
tasks
.
The speed of advance for the ARSHIP eliminates those
assaults that require a nearly stationary target or one
that travels at relatively low speed, 5 knots or slower.
The higher the target's speed, the harder it is to gain
access to the vessel while underway. In this respect, the
vessel's speed can be used as a form of self-defense.
The ARSHIP 's position also dictates the type of attack
that can and cannot be made. Furthermore, its position in
open ocean will allow it to be more defensible as well as
reducing the likelihood of less robust threats. Inport and
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in confined waters inherently reduces the maneuverability
of the ARSHIP, making it a sitting duck.
The state of readiness of the vessel and crew can be
key factors for success. Readiness is a factor that is
based on the perceived likelihood of direct confrontation
against an adversary. The level of readiness increases as
the political, strategic and tactical situation with an
adversary moves across the spectrum of conflict from peace
to war (graphically left to right, Figure 1.). On the
farthest left side of the spectrum is peace followed by
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) . MOOTW consists
of Humanitarian Aid (HA) , Non-combatant Evacuation
Operations (NEO) , and any other similar type of operations
conducted by the U.S. military "throughout the world. The
next stages of the spectrum refer to Deterrence, Defense,
and Compellance (War) in that order. War consists of
Lesser Regional Conflicts (LRC) and Major Regional
Conflicts (MRC)
.
Along with the escalation of the level of conflict,
the proximate range from the perceived threat further
influences the readiness of the crew and vessel. The level
of readiness will increase as they approach weapons' ranges
of an adversary. In Figure 1, the top graph shows how the
level of readiness fluctuates along the spectrum of
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conflict. The bottom two graphs show the difference in
readiness according to the range from the threat. The
farther away from the perceived threat a vessel is, the
lower its readiness level will be relative when it is
closer to the threat. This difference will continue until
a point is reached along the conflict spectrum when attack
is possible anywhere and at any time.
For the two readiness curves to meet, an adversary
must have the ability to launch attacks that can reach U.S.
assets globally. This state of higher readiness cannot be
sustained for prolonged periods and will wane over time.
Therefore, as it ebbs, the heightened state of readiness is
no longer a factor in the vessel's favor and becomes a
vulnerability. The crew can become desensitized to
constant warnings and authentic cues of an actual attack
may not be heeded.
Any advantage associated with readiness is in the
attacker's favor, because he decides when, where, and how
he will attack. The target's state of alert can be
heightened if warning is given in advance. The readiness
level is also dependent on the ARSHIP's geographic
position. As shown in Figure 2, the readiness curves
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Figure 1. Readiness Curve Across the Spectrum of
Conflict and Proximate Distance to Threat
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Inport the preoccupation of the crew to perform
routine maintenance or repair equipment along with the
crew's liberty ashore moves the curve to the right.
This decreased readiness compared to the other
geographic areas affords a window of opportunity for an
adversary. Operating in open ocean, the crew is aware of
their surroundings as far as the equipment can detect.
Equipment is operating and manned, and the crew is focused
on the tasks at hand. Levels of readiness are further
shifted to the left when operating in confined water. Our
definition of confined water explains this shift. The need
to monitor the surroundings for maneuvering places the crew
at a higher readiness level than other geographic areas
.
An adversary who understands the subtle shift of readiness
among the geographic areas can use it as an advantage to
plan and execute an attack.
Like the crew, the ARSHIP itself must be at a high
state of readiness. The limits associated with the
equipment affect the ability of the ARSHIP to respond to
possible threats. Without special search radar, a threat
built of composite material may not display a radar
signature and the low speed of the threat may allow the
equipment to disregard it. Therefore, the system may not



































Figure 2 . Readiness Curves Across the Spectrum of Conflict
in the Three Geographic Areas
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A key part of equipment readiness is the person
operating it. The reliance on human factors requires an
individual to be vigilant and most importantly properly
trained. The training involves knowing how to properly
operate the equipment. Every crewmember must be properly
trained and familiar with all weapons and equipment
available on the ARSHIP for self-defense. The weapons and
equipment are only as good as the sailors using them. More
than the ability to operate and repair the equipment is
needed. The skill and experience of understanding what to
look for is a critical part of the equation. In addition,
the threat must also be reported in a timely manner.
If integral equipment is not operating, a threat may
approach undetected. Often while inport, radar and other
detection equipment are not manned or operated. The same
can be said for weapon systems. During inport periods, a
quarterdeck watch is posted along with a roving watch. The
remainder of the crew is conducting maintenance, sleeping,
or on liberty. If conducting "Sea and Anchor Detail"
operations in confined water, crewmembers may be too
occupied to properly monitor detection equipment.
Unlike transiting to port through confined water, the
daily routine associated with open ocean operations can
become monotonous and dull the senses. The designed CONOPS
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of the ARSHIP does not allow much slack to break the
continuous schedule day after day for extended periods.
As the vessel and crew's readiness can fluctuate, the
leadership that dictate the heightening of strategic and
tactical readiness are also influenced by events taking
place around them. The command elements, which usually
think in terms of conventional threats, evaluate the
situation and order the perceived level of sufficient
readiness. As the conflict escalates, conventional warfare
thinkers prepare for possible attack. As illustrated in
Figure 3 , the area above the readiness curves represents
the latitude that potential attackers have relative to
their target . The reason for the curves never reaching
full readiness lies in the inability to properly prepare
for all possible attacks, conventional or unconventional.
Figure 3 . Actual Readiness Curve Versus Perceived
Readiness Curve Across the Spectrum of Conflict
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In Figure 3 , the lower readiness curve depicts how
conventional thinking will increase readiness. This means
that the threats that might have been effective earlier in
the conflict spectrum subsequently become challenged. This
does not eliminate them as options, but they will face
additional obstacles. The conflict moves from left to
right across the spectrum. The upper curve represents how
readiness should increase with the addition of thinking of
unconventional threats as a feasible threat option. This
separation between conventional and unconventional thinking
forms an area between the curves
.
Using the Figure 1 discussion to frame the situation,
a conventional mindset only acknowledges the range of
conventional weapons as the threat. For unconventional
threats having unlimited range, the "distance" from the
threat is not as great as perceived by the conventional
leadership. This "distance" becomes an advantage the
adversary can exploit through the utilization of long range
special operations.
E. PREEMPTION AS A THREAT
Understanding why a state would conduct a special
operation against the ARSHIP shows how such an operation
fits into the context of the conflict. In times of
relative peace, the political utility of a special
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operations mission is higher than during an actual armed
conflict where the special operations would have tactical
utility. Context poses issues that are regularly forgotten
in traditional U.S. military thought. Referring back to
the section on political utility and singularity, and
coupling those theories with the issues of readiness across
the spectrum of conflict, we suggest that a preemptive or
preventative strike is one of the greatest threats to the
ARSHIP.
Prevention is a form of non-attributable aggression
prior to a conflict. This is a viable option that is
executed under the premise of deterrence and defense. In
the case of the ARSHIP, it is suspected of participating
and playing a key role in a forthcoming conflict and
targeted on that premise. This targeting can be
accomplished long beforehand, dependent on the time to
repair or replace it, thus preventing the ARSHIP from being
utilized effectively in the conflict.
Preemption is aggression utilized at the outset of
conflict. This kind of strike would be utilized to
initiate hostilities based on a key component of the U.S.'
defense or retaliation forces being neutralized. The
attacker would want to employ a one-time surprise to take
out key nodes in the U.S. military potential and exact the
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highest toll. The purpose is to raise the probability of
success of the future engagement.
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IV. POTENTIAL SPECIAL OPERATIONS THREATS TO THE ARSHIP
By using the definition of special operations the
previous list of possible threats has been refined. The
elimination of threats, such as mines, artillery and
missiles, and all large pieces of military potential
becomes apparent as one distinguishes conventional from
unconventional. These threats can still be used as the
delivery platform to position an unconventional threat
within attacking distance. However, we will only focus on
threats that can be used directly against the ARSHIP. The
threats this chapter focuses on are: combat swimmer, mini-
sub/manned torpedo, assault force, boats, and aircraft.
Chapter IV is organized in a way to illustrate precise
operational options against the ARSHIP' s defense, and
illustrate their effectiveness and substitutability for
other courses of action. This organization begins by
outlining the characteristics of the operation's attack
modes, its objectives (the critical nodes of the ARSHIP)
and the^ means of meeting those objectives. The center
section of the outline elaborates on the mitigating factors
limiting the aggressor, the environmental constraints, and
the defense constraints the specific course of action is
faced with or can exploit. These will be put into
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perspective in the third section of each operational
outline. There the operation's likelihood of success and
employment, its probable effectiveness and its utility-
relative to other operations are examined.
A. COMBAT SWIMMER
1 . Modes
SUB-SURFACE: This mode utilizes divers to approach
the ARSHIP under the water. A team of divers can approach
as a convoy or the team may be broken into pairs to reach
the target ship on their own, so as not to become entangled
with others in the dark waters. A classic example of a
combat swimmer mission is the U.S. Navy SEAL mission during
Operation Just Cause in Panama that destroyed Manuel
Noriega's yacht. Although that mission was able to destroy
the target, the size of charges that divers can carry
limits the amount of damage that can be exacted on the
ARSHIP.
Divers need to be launched from some sort of platform.
The platform needs to bring the divers within swimming
range of the target. This can be done from land, boats, or
air but must be unobserved. A parachute jump or helicopter
cast can effectively bring the divers or their subsequent
small boats to within close proximity to their target area.
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Combat swimmer operations would normally be carried
out at night. However, murky waters of harbors may allow
divers to approach the ARSHIP undetected in daylight. The
divers breath compressed gases that allow for an oxygen
rich mixture to circulate through the lungs and a carbon
dioxide scrubbing system. Most re-breather closed circuit
scuba units use granules of a substance that absorbs CO 2 and
allows the volume of unconsumed 2 to loop back into the
system. This allows extended duration dives up to four
hours. Elite forces utilize the closed circuit scuba
equipment for insertion and combat swimmer missions for
this reason because there is no bubble trail on the surface
following the divers.
A combat swimmer mission, due to the speed limitations
of a human, can only be accomplished while the ARSHIP is
inport. The mission must also have sufficient intelligence
to be able to locate the ARSHIP, its pier, slip or
anchorage. This is important because the combat swimmer
utilizes charts and tide tables to plan the route to reach
the target from their submersion point. The divers go from
point A to point B underwater utilizing tidal current
vectors and swimmer vectors to calculate an underwater
compass course. This compass course is only effective when
the launch points are exact, the target is where it is
53
supposed to be, and the two competing vectors of swimmer
advance velocity and current velocity are predicted
accurately. The stealth of this depends on remaining
submerged throughout the mission. Coming to the surface to
"peak" and see if you are on the right track is extremely
dangerous in hostile confined waters with active patrol
boats
.
SURFACE: Surface swimmers have less of a tactical
surprise advantage due to the fact that there are heads or
other appendages breaking the surface of the water allowing
for visible detection. Surface swimmers, traveling alone
or in an organized team need to be launched from somewhere
near the target. However, surface swimmers may have
similar objectives as the submerged divers.
2. Objectives
There are two possible objectives of the combat
swimmer mission. The first is to reach the ship from the
water, place explosive charges on critical components, and
swim away. The second is to utilize the stealth of the
water to approach the ARSHIP in order board the ARSHIP from
the water's edge.
DAMAGE: The objective of causing damage is
straightforward. It involves surreptitiously attaching
explosives to the outside of the ship on critical nodes.
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Due to the relatively small size of explosives that can be
hauled in by divers, the critical nodes of a steel-hulled
warship are small in number. It is physically infeasible
to carry enough explosives to the target via divers to
'kill the ARSHIP. ' However, the critical nodes below the
water line do allow for enough destruction to effect its
mobility. Nodes such as the struts, which hold the shaft,
can be destroyed so the weight of the shaft will bend
itself, rendering the ARSHIP immobile until it can be dry-
docked and repaired. Likewise, nodes such as variable
pitch propellers can be warped so as to produce cavitation
or high speed warbling of the ARSHIP. Both negate its
stealth advantage. The packing glands are weak points that
make the hull more easily breached. Shaped charges can
pierce the outer hull but must be placed outside of
critical electrical or propulsion spaces that are located
near the external hull to have the greatest effect. All of
these targets produce short-term effects that only delay
the availability of the ARSHIP or its speed of advance
toward an area of employment
.
BOARD: The concept of the assaulting force will be
discussed later in this chapter. There are similar
concepts to the combat swimmer and the waterborne assault.
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These will be emphasized here whereas their objectives will
be discussed in Section C.
3 . Mitigating Factors
Aggressor Considerations: There are many physiological
constraints when divers breathe high percentages of oxygen
under pressure. "0 2 toxicity" is the diagnosis for
prolonged exposure to compressed Oxygen that results in
nervous disorders. Unclassified but indicative numbers
warning of 2 toxicity range from 4 hours exposure when
breathing 2 at 2 feet depth to 10 minutes of exposure at
fifty feet. Death can result, especially if irresponsible
diving has gotten the divers within proximity of their
target but the medical emergency has forced them to
surface. By doing so, they have exposed the operation,
costing their own lives and threatening those of the other
divers. This is not a common ailment, but is a factor in
the training of responsible diving tactics.
Physical limitations of the divers include the amount
of explosive they can carry, the speed at which they can
swim, and their exposure limits to extremely cold water.
The speed of the swimmers makes it impossible for them to
achieve contact with the ARSHIP while it is underway.
Additionally, if the water currents are such that the
swimmers cannot overcome opposing currents they will never
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reach their target. The extreme cold of the water will
dictate the type of thermal outerwear worn to protect the
divers from hypothermia. However, water exchanges heat 80%
faster than air, and prolonged exposure regardless of
thermal protection will eventually endanger the divers.
Characteristics of the equipment utilized for this
mission profile can both add and detract from the
effectiveness of the mission. One such characteristic is
the compressed O 2 . Normal scuba tanks hold enough air for a
one to one and half -hour dive. Compressed O 2 tanks
circulating through a scrubber can extend shallow dive
times to four hours.
.
Inert gases mixed with O 2 extend those
physiological limits beyond four hours. This translates to
a difference of underwater movement from 3000 yards to a
possible distance of 7500 or 8500 yards. Even more
influential is the distance the divers can swim on the
surface from their launch platform to their submersion
point
.
Another limiting characteristic is the explosives and
the detonation devices carried. Clock detonators placed on
5-10 lb. shaped charges are the community standard. Each
diver can carry two of these. A sizable force could send 5
pairs to a target. This translates to around 75 lbs. of
explosives placed at critical points on the ARSHIP.
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Sounding impressive and actually being effective are two
separate things. One substitution would be to carry-
traditional haversacks of explosive, which would double the
amount of explosives placed under the ARSHIP, but
haversacks do not have attaching mechanisms nor are they
shaped charges. This quantity is not enough to break a
keel and permanently sink the ARSHIP.
Environmental Considerations: The primary medium
concern of these types of missions is exposure time in the
water and the amount of thermal protection needed to keep
the body warm for prolonged mission duration. Beyond the
normal constraints of exposure, swimming in confined areas
poses issues of water clarity and silhouette visibility
from the surface. This is only an issue for surface
surveillance during the day or a full moon where the water
is clear and the bottom is contrasting the divers. One
phenomenon of many bodies of water is bioluminescence;
organisms in the water that glow when excited by motion. A
swimmer, whether on the surface or submerged, may have the
misfortune of exciting them by disturbing the water. This
glow, a bright neon color, can vary in intensity. If
bioluminescence qualities are high, the glow could easily
be seen from long distances if near the surface, or deeper
if the water is clear.
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In the discussion of biology, we must consider that
the swimmers share a medium in which they are no longer on
the top of the food chain. Mammals and fish in the water
can react adversely to the presence of a foreigner. Their
reactions can simply be the unusual barking of sea lions
that would be considered as early warning defense, or it
could mean becoming a hors d'oeuvres for "Whitey.
"
In bad weather, divers can get seasick when
submerged in high sea states. The constant swaying without
a reference plane can cause vertigo and nausea.
Defender Considerations: The readiness of the
personnel on the ship plays a small role in defense from
combat swimmer operations. The primary concern in this
category would be under conditions of watch standing. The
watchstander must diligently be scanning the waters near
the ARSHIP and monitoring any defensive measures they have
set out to repel a swimmer attack. This is a tedious and
boring proposition. Likewise, the principle of a swimmer
attack in a "friendly" port would also seem, to a
watchstander, unlikely, causing him to let down his guard.
The ship's equipment does little the defense against a
combat swimmer attack. If the ARSHIP design has one, its
sonar could be radiated regularly at high power to disturb
the inbound divers. The amount of power that a sonar dome
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can emit into the water is enough to destroy eardrums and
be especially uncomfortable for all semi permeable cavities
of the human body. Suctions and discharges also pose
interesting quandaries for divers who must travel up or
down the length of the ship during the course of the
mission.
A ship that anchored or moored to a buoy poses a more
difficult navigational problem to the divers than a ship
that is pier-side. There are few geographic references
that divers can use to verify their path. Pylons,
navigation buoys, quay walls, and pier lighting are
excellent navigational aids to divers under the water who
are attempting to find a target without breaking the
surface to look. Additionally, the positioning of the ship
in a well-protected and trafficked waterway poses a threat
to the divers of being run over or spotted if they
experience difficulties and must come to the surface.
Remembering the issues of human limitations due to the
speed of currents, the ARSHIP could be strategically
located near river inlets or power plant cooling discharges
to create a current that is impassable.
4. Utility and Substitutability
Cost and Asset Availability: The personnel required to
accomplish this mission profile need to have the training
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to dive using closed circuit scuba, navigate underwater,
handle underwater explosives. The closed circuit scuba
system can be found commercially and there are many amateur
and professional divers who navigate well underwater. If
these personnel were to be commissioned and given the
mission profiles of what to carry and where to put it, they
could successfully attempt this mission. Elite units
throughout the world's navies train for this mission
regularly. The extent of their training may be costly, but
most definitely increases their probability of
effectiveness to near perfection.
The cost of a closed circuit scuba rig is around US$
4000. A team equipped with enough explosives to do damage
to a ship would then run about $60,000 to stand up.
Additionally, the boarding party would be higher due to the
number of personnel needed to secure the objective. This
is not an inordinate amount of money relative to the
likelihood of success due to the clandestine nature of the
mission.
Benefit: Due to their clandestine nature and the
effectiveness of their attack the combat swimmer mission
has the characteristic of singularity. The effectiveness
of only altering the ARSHIP's geographic location for
specified time will alter the weighting that the decision-
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maker will ultimately lay upon its relative utility.
However, given the means of infiltrating a hostile port, or
distanced port with lower defenses, this mission is allows
for total anonymity, total clandestine success, and it is
the most dangerous threat to the ARSHIP in any port.




Mini -subs and manned torpedoes allow underwater
transportation at speeds and distances unparalleled by
kick-stroke-and-gliding (swimming) . This allows attacks to
be launched covertly from platforms at greater distances
and with greater destructive payload than the combat
swimmer. The mini-sub and the manned torpedoes can venture
into waters that are shallower and less maneuverable than
those of conventional submarines. Many of the mini-subs
and manned torpedoes are open to the water so the drivers
or transported personnel must breathe compressed air and
wear thermal protection.
2. Objectives
Transport vehicles can bring explosives to the ARSHIP
from greater distances. Their advantage relative to the
combat swimmer, besides distance, is the amount of
explosives that can be delivered. These vehicles either
can trail an explosives package behind them or be laden
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with the explosives as in the case of the torpedo. The
objective would be to place the explosive packages in a
position where they would 'kill the ARSHIP' or do the most
damage. The keel of a ship can easily be broken when a
mini-sub trails 50 to 100 times as much explosives to the
target as the combat swimmer . The manned torpedo can do
the same with a terminal warhead that has carefully
navigated to its target. The discussion of equipment
limitations outlines the relative disadvantages the
submersible transports have to combat swimmer operations
partially offsetting this asymmetrical advantage.
3 . Mitigating Factors
Aggressor Considerations: The same constraints present
to combat swimmer are present here, except for the relative
distances and speeds of advance. There are training
constraints regarding navigation systems that are more
sophisticated than the simple compass and chart work of the
combat swimmer. All in all, the human factors involved
with direct control and precision targeting are aspects
that favor this mode of explosives delivery.
The fact that there is a rapidly moving transport at
depth causes certain safety issues to arise concerning dive
physics and Pulmonary Over-inflation Syndrome (POS) . These
considerations can be trained for to near perfection.
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However, the utilization of poorly trained personnel can
result in mission failure and death.
Breathing equipment used on these transports by the
crew is similar to that used by the combat swimmer. The
speed of advance and mission duration may be dictated by
the physiological limits of the crew or by the amount of
fuel carried. Speed of advance, the transport's size, and
noise-producing electronics on board make these transports
detectable to passive and active sonar. Additionally,
maneuverability is decreased compared to the combat
swimmer. This is important in high traffic areas and tight
geographical features. The size of these transports also
produces a larger silhouette in clear water.
Environmental Considerations: Daytime operations are
restricted by clarity of water and possible detection from
above the surface. Moonlight and water clarity affect
nighttime operations to some extent . Sea state plays a
larger role with these transports due to their
susceptibility to swells and their use of ballasting. High
sea states and large swells can cause depth changes at a
rate up to 6 feet per second. This rate is dangerous to
the diver breathing compressed gasses. (The suggested safe
rate of ascent to avoid POS is one foot per second.)
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Exposure characteristics are the same as for the
combat swimmer. Water clarity is more crucial do to the
size and speed of these transports. The mission is not
immune to biological constraints, and bioluminescence
becomes more pronounced with speed. The threat of being a
shark's lunch is however, greatly decreased.
Defender Considerations: The defender considerations
in the case of manned torpedoes and mini -subs are much the
same as for the combat swimmer. However, the active or
passive sonar if turned on and monitored in port would have
a better than zero chance to detect incoming mini-subs or
manned torpedoes
.
If the mission was designed for terminal guidance of a
warhead, then the two transports could effectively target
the ship while it is underway. Optimally, this would only
be done when in confined waters and when the target has
been positively identified. Higher speeds would cause
'louder' sonar signatures of the incoming warhead and
possibly reduce the effectiveness of that type of mission.
The mini-sub and manned torpedoes are less affected by
swift currents. Their navigation systems allow them to
find their targets more easily and precisely without
needing physical references. High traffic lanes, as
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discussed earlier, impose navigational hazards to all
submerged threats
.
One large constraint is the movement of the
submersible transports to the region of the target. It is
easier to deliver divers and their scuba equipment to a
region than a large torpedo or mini-sub. The ability of
the attacker to do that will play greatly in mission
selection.
4. Utility and Substitutability
Cost and Asset Availability: The personnel constraints
are similar to those for a combat swimmer. However the
likelihood of procuring commercial mini-subs is low.
Drivers could come from the pool of experienced divers and
would only need to be trained on this submersible vehicle.
Relative to the combat swimmer, this mission would require
less personnel to have the same or higher destructive
effects; one to six man units.
Many countries have hollowed out torpedoes and added
controllable steering and speed to enter this mission
specialty. The crudeness of the transport will make more
demands on the crew. The transport is difficult to acquire
more so due to required navigational equipment rather than
the submersible vehicles. However, commercial and military
66
sonar can be easily adapted to create an onboard navigation
system.
Benefit: Mini-subs and manned torpedoes are another
means of clandestinely infiltrating a waterway not
accessible by conventional submarines to exact a toll on
the ARSHIP. The quality of singularity of these methods is
due to the fact that this mission can actually deliver
enough explosives to 'kill the ARSHIP.' The main
differences between the combat swimmer and the submersible
transports are the embedded internal and external
constraints. These are based on the objective of the
mission, the availability of the assets, and the underwater
geography of the mission area. If the objective is to kill
the ARSHIP, the submersible vehicle is the only method to
bring explosives to the ARSHIP underwater.
C. ATTACK FORCE
An attacking force can come from all three traditional
mediums, sea, air and land. This section will address all
three modes of attack as well as their relative advantages
and disadvantages. One mode of launching an assault will
not be discussed in this section, the combat swimmer
assault. The reason for its lack of discussion is due to
its dual nature. First, the ingress of the combat swimmer
assault is the same as an explosives attack. Secondly,
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once on board the force acts like any other, with the same
objectives. The only difference is that the ARSHIP must be
stationary and the swimmers climb from the surface of the
water vice from a boat.
1 . Modes
SEA: An attack force directly launched from a vessel
inspires thoughts of swashbuckling and piracy. There are
distinguishing characteristics of these courses of action.
The primary distinguishing characteristic of is the size of
the vessel coming alongside to launch boarders assaulting
the ARSHIP. The three primary categories are small boats,
large boats, and ships. Small boats are craft 3 feet in
length or less. Large boats are from 30 to 90 feet, while
a ship is larger than 90 feet. Sub-categories of these are
distinguished by the type of the craft; commercial,
leisure, or military.
The sea threat is one where boarding can only take
place when direct contact of the two vessels occurs. The
boarding team can climb aboard the ARSHIP via a flexible
hook ladder to carry out their mission. This boarding can
take place in all of the geographic areas. The sub-
categories have large ramifications as to when the
approaching attacker will be distinguished as a threat. On
first glance, smaller vessels would warrant less alarm as
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they approach due to the cognitive bias of the observers on
board the ARSHIP. Likewise, leisure and commercial vessels
would warrant less of an immediate response. Therefore, it
behooves the aggressor to select those vessels that would
proceed closest to the ARSHIP without alarming the crew.
AIR: The air threat is very similar to the sea threat
in that a delivery vehicle carries the assault team to the
ARSHIP. Logically, this must be an aircraft with vertical
lift capability, a helicopter. The assault team can be
brought to the deck of the ARSHIP by two means, the
helicopter landing on the deck or using ropes to execute a
controlled descent from the aircraft to the deck. Modes of
descending from a helicopter to the deck are fast-roping
and rappelling. Fast-roping involves sliding a team down a
3 inch thick rope without hard connectors or safety
harnesses. A team member wears insulated welder's gloves
to hold onto the rope as it passes through their hands on
descent. The control comes when the team member squeezes
the rope prior to his collision with the pitching deck.
This slows his downward momentum allowing for a controlled
landing. A well-trained assault force can land 20 members
from 60 feet using only one rope in about ten seconds.
With rappelling there are constraints of harnesses and
hard attachment points to the rope that must be secured
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before descending and discarded upon reaching the deck.
Depending on the number of ropes, a well-trained team can
land 20 members from 60 feet in about 90 seconds. The
advantage of rappelling is the longer length of possible
descent. Fast-roping is only feasible for distances of
less than 7 5 feet, whereas rappelling allows landing from
heights up to 150 feet.
The use of gliders or parachutes to land a team
onboard the ARSHIP is likely only when the ship is in port.
Execution of a mass landing of parachutes from any drop
height onto the ARSHIP requires great skill and training.
This would only be by maneuverable parachutes, such as
those commonly flown when sky diving and not static line
deployment. Gliders like those used in World War II would
be effective during nighttime. However, being able to land
one or more gliders specifically onto a target the size of
the ARSHIP would be nearly impossible.
LAND: Land assault on the ARSHIP is possible when the
ship is tied to a pier. The land assault would entail the
assault team either forcibly entering, clandestinely
entering, or overtly entering a naval base, and then
proceeding to board the vessel. The assault team would
need to strike swiftly with precision and not expect to
stay long in the target due to follow-on security forces
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being alerted. The team must utilize the element of
surprise before hostilities begin. This method of
insertion onto the naval base could utilize small boats,
parachuting, swimming, or over land navigation to reach
their objective. Overt ingress to the target can be
accomplished under the ruse of pretending to be
'indigenous' personnel or activities that do not look out
of the ordinary. A force could hide in a delivery truck,
or wear local military fatigues executing a routine entry
onto a base. Red Cell activities of SEAL Team SIX in the
1980 's exposed the vulnerabilities of the United States'
Naval Bases. They utilized all of the tactics described
above with great success.
2. Objectives
Whether an assault force ingresses from sea, air or
land, its objective is the same. The mission is dictated
by the strategy, recalling the list in Chapter III of the
five effects that an attacker would want to achieve on the
ARSHIP. These mission drivers dictate the size of the
force, the amount and type of arms carried by that force,
and the specific actions at the objective.
The first objective of any assaulting force would be
to neutralize the crew. First and foremost, the crew must
be killed or detained. Deadly force would require the
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assault team to use hand-held weapons or quick-acting
deadly chemical /biological agents from which the team was
protected. Non-lethal force would require a more
permissive environment than is normally associated with an
U.S. warship.
To sink the ARSHIP, the assault team would most likely
need to place huge amounts of explosives on board the
vessel in strategic places. This would take time and
extreme amounts of exertion. The amount of explosives
necessary to sink a warship would be difficult for an
assault team to bring onto the vessel without follow-on
delivery. Each member of the assault team would be
required to carry at least 35 lbs. of high explosives.
This would severely inhibit on the mobility and efficiency
of the team.
To affect the ARSHIP' s geo-position, propulsion or
steering machinery would need to be temporarily or
permanently destroyed. The extent to which the United
States Navy could repair or replace the damaged equipment
would determine the effectiveness of that mission.
A major concern is that the ARSHIP could be hi- jacked
and piloted by the assault team to their position of
choice. Remotely piloted or not this would require the
destruction of communications equipment. For those
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instances where a team was not able to seize the crew, they
may enter into the labyrinth of passageways and proceed
internally to objective points. If the team were to be
able to breach into internal passageways they may be able
to head directly to critical nodes, such as propulsion,
steering, and electrical generators.
To affect the ARSHIP's rate of fire or probability of
hit, the assaulting team can distract the crew to the point
that it is more occupied with fighting than firing
missiles. Moreover, if the ship's fire control is by
remote targeting, the assault team need only destroy or
impair the communications nodes on board. Falling short of
seizing the crew or the vessel, the assault team could
proceed to a secondary objective of destroying critical
topside nodes. The assault force could also destroy the
hydraulic mechanisms on the VLS tube hatches, which would
make it impossible to launch those missiles. Topside
antennas would be easy targets as well. In the instance of
a portable antenna being used to replace a destroyed one,
the decreased link margin coupled with a raised bit error
rate may cause mis-targeting data or delay the rate of
fire. The decreased link margin and raised bit error rate
is due the fact the replacement antenna has considerably
less gain. Any node that would permanently or temporarily
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slow the rate of fire of the ARSHIP can be accessed with a
well-trained team once onboard, even without the seizure of
the crew.
3 . Mitigating Factors
Aggressor Considerations: An assault team must have
enough personnel to accomplish entry and seizure of the
ARSHIP. Its size will also depend on the advantage the
assaulting team expects to achieve by surprise. An assault
that has strategic and tactical surprise will require fewer
personnel and expect less attrition than one that has lost
surprise
.
The amount of equipment carried by a team member
should not exceed a physical and tactically effective
limit. A human male may be able to pack 125 lbs. However,
that weight would be cumbersome and tactically inefficient.
A reasonable expectation for a load of equipment or
explosives would be 35-40 lbs. Considering that most
assault teams would be tethered by communications, this
would exclude some members from carrying a load of
explosives. Additional breaching equipment and charges
would be distributed among the assault force at the expense
of loading explosives. Without means of mass destruction
there is only so much critical damage that the assault team
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can do in a short amount of time beyond seizing the crew
and vessel
.
Other limitations of the personnel depend on training
and their competency with fast-roping, climbing aboard from
craft alongside the ARSHIP, and weapons and demolitions
experience. In addition, the expertise required to land a
parachute on the vessel and then begin conducting an
assault takes extensive training. Seemingly, the boarding
of an U.S. warship requires the skill of professionally
trained elite units. These skills are found in trained
military, mercenary, and organized crime (pirate) units.
Necessary equipment to accomplish these methods of
attack depends on the objective and mode of attack. An
inport assault requires little additional equipment beyond
whatever the team would utilize to reach their objective
and breach the defenses of a naval base.
Waterborne assaults require ladders and assault craft.
The limiting factor on the assault craft is its maximum
speed of advance and handling characteristics. Small and
large boats offer the greatest maneuverability. However,
their speed of advance across high seas, their limited
range, and the length of the freeboard that the assault
team must climb, become limiting factors of their
employment. Additionally, the size of the boat utilized is
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governed by the amount of personnel it is must carry, the
amount of fuel it can carry and the speed of advance that
is necessary to transit long distances under strict time
constraints e.g., (the cover of darkness). Of note,
smaller craft can be delivered by aircraft (parachute) or
helicopter (cast) to within a reasonable range of the
ARSHIP.
Helicopters used for an air attack need to be large
enough to carry troops. Fast-ropes or rappelling ropes are
easily acquired. However the helicopters are constrained
by the distance they can travel when laden with troops and
ammunition. This projected range from probable launch
points should be considered as a factor in their defensive
posturing.
Environmental Considerations: Low visibility, once the
aggressor has located and identified the ARSHIP, is to the
advantage of the attacker. The movement of a relatively
small force, small watercraft, slow moving air vehicles, or
indigenous craft and vehicles go relatively undetected in
low visibility. Constant alertness inherently decreases a
passive defender's perception of the threats' ability or
probability to assault the ARSHIP.
During the light of day an assault is less likely to
occur unless the attacker does not have the ability to
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locate and identify the ARSHIP at night. In this instance
the attacker would approach under the ruse of being an
indigenous activity. During the night, the illumination of
the moon plays a great role in exposing a force. Sheltered
from sight by darkness, trained units can almost always
approach the ARSHIP undetected and achieve tactical
surprise
.
Weather considerations such as sea state will have
great effects on smaller waterborne assault craft. This
will determine their range and maneuverability, as well as
how seasick the assault team gets before they reach the
ARSHIP. Wind affects the likelihood of an approach and
ability of landing a team onboard a moving ARSHIP. The
helicopter may be constrained from physically landing
onboard the ARSHIP, and the wind swept ropes may make the
assault team fall short of their intended landing points.
Additionally, sea state adds complications to roping onto a
pitching deck. The rope is to maintain contact with the
deck. As the deck moves upward and downward relative to
the ropes hanging from a stationary helicopter, there is a
danger of the ropes no longer reaching the deck when the
ship is in a trough. Another problem is if the deck
accelerates upward at a descending team member when the
ship hits a peak. Additionally, a wet and pitching deck
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can make tactical movement difficult for the assault team.
Despite the difficulties of conducting an assault in bad
weather, that is the time when an assault is least expected
and the ARSHIP is the most vulnerable.
Medium characteristics play less of a role in the
assault force unless exposure to wind, rain, sea state, and
ambient temperatures would render members o£ the team
physically ill to the point that it degrades their mission
or excludes them from the mission leaving the team short
handed
.
Defender Considerations: Readiness is an issue that
has been discussed at length. The principal factor to
observe is that attacks are most likely under conditions of
darkness or foul weather.
The speed of advance alluded to earlier will affect
missions that attempt to board a moving ARSHIP. By
altering speeds and sharply changing directions the ARSHIP
can affect the ability of an assault force to board as well
as buy critical time to form a "security alert force" to
repel boarders
.
In the open ocean, small boats are less likely to
independently transit distances farther than 7 5 miles under
cover of darkness. Alongside a pier, the ARSHIP faces the
threat of land assault that has repeatedly been executed
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successfully by Naval Special Warfare units. The ARSHIP
should be cordoned off in more secure basing, much like
submarines and special weapons.
4. Utility and Substitutability-
Cost and Asset Availability: Personnel for a
coordinated assault need to be highly trained unless the
assault is merely a suicide mission. The suicide mission
merely requires the personnel to gain access to the ARSHIP
and then detonate their explosives. Elite units can most
likely only carry out a smooth and efficient assault.
These units are not difficult to acquire in the case of
mercenary units and pirates, both of which work for money.
Trained military units, however, are more difficult to
acquire and take time and preparation before they are
seasoned enough to attack and expect success
.
The assault platform is one of the major limiting
constraints. Helicopters and large commercial vessels are
high-ticket items. Therefore, powers that have limited
resources are far more reluctant to employ this type of
mission. Small boats and indigenous boats however are more
readily available for acquisition and the cost of their
loss is more tolerable. The least costly of all is the
land assault, requiring only a minimal investment at times.
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Benefit: The prospect of seizing the ARSHIP is one
that would make any aggressor salivate. Additionally, a
successful attack on the ARSHIP would be politically and
strategically impressive, attracting great attention. If
the ARSHIP were operating in a region that was thought to
be safe but nonetheless was attacked, either fleet tactics
would be changed or the ARSHIP would attempt to move
further from those areas of vulnerability. The latter
would move the missile ranges of the ARSHIP out to sea,
affecting the probability of hit as discussed in Chapter
III.
Because of the ARSHIP 's small crew and minimum
defenses, the ability of a trained force to board and seize
it seems high. The attack would be almost as simple as
boarding a hostile commercial cargo ship, which pirates in
Asian waters accomplish almost routinely.
The larger question is the likelihood of the approach
being discovered and thwarted. As discussed earlier, small
or indigenous vehicles have higher probability of success
gaining proximity to the vessel undetected or unnoticed.
Additionally, the capabilities granted to nodal destruction
or seizure by an assault force greatly outweigh the
precision of inbound missiles, torpedoes or projectiles.
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This makes the threat of an assault highly productive for
its investment.
D. BOAT ATTACK
The discussion of boat attacks will center on
their use as a weapon platform against the ARSHIP,
and not their use as a personnel delivery platform.
To see how a boat can be used as a launch platform,
refer to Section C. That section will also be
useful to understand the limitations and
capabilities of different styles and sizes of boats.
'Boats' in this section include earlier defined
vessels as well as commercial and leisure vessels
that may be larger than 90 feet. Boats have the
ability to converge on the target with a minimal
amount of suspicion. The covertness of this




Along almost every waterway in which the U.S. Navy
operates, there are local users that rely on that same
water for their existence or recreation. These users are
fisherman and merchants that move their goods by boat.
Additionally, recreational boaters may be on the water
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enjoying themselves and their surroundings. This activity
(clutter) becomes commonplace while operating in littoral
waters near landmasses or on the open seas along sea-lanes.
The ARSHIP may detect boats visually or electronically, but
many times not perceive them as a threat. The attacker's
ability to take advantage of this will allow him to
approach within weapon release range.
2. Objectives
Once within range, the boat can fire at the ARSHIP
with small arms, machine guns, large caliber weapons,
rockets, or torpedoes. The attacker's goal dictates the
targeted node on the ARSHIP. To kill the ARSHIP, the
attacker would need to destroy the watertight integrity of
the hull. Loaded with explosives, a boat could come
alongside the vessel and detonate deadly cargo. The
explosion can destroy machinery and vital equipment in the
direct vicinity of the blast or breach the hull and flood
the compartments. However, the explosion would have to be
large for the blast and subsequent flooding to sink the
ARSHIP. A torpedo attack would have the same desired
effect as a boat loaded with explosives. Damage to
navigation and propulsion equipment can render the ARSHIP
unable to maneuver, making it either incapable of leaving
port or requiring a return to port for repairs.
.
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The goals of influencing the geo-location and the rate
of fire of the ARSHIP can be accomplished by boat attacks.
By using weapons such as small arms, machine guns, large
caliber weapons, and rockets, the small boat can attempt to
destroy or damage the vital equipment required to navigate,
communicate, or launch missiles. The size of the attacking
boat is dependent upon the size and weight of the weapon
being launched from it.
Small arms can be used effectively to eliminate the
crew and to a lesser extent damage vital equipment.
Machine guns can be used against people and equipment with
greater effect. Machine gunners can rake the ARSHIP 's
exposed topside appendages. Large caliber weapons and
rockets will accomplish the same results, but these weapons
possess more destructive power. A .50 caliber machine gun
can cause severe damage to equipment that is vital for the
ARSHIP to perform its mission. Targets might include
antennas and exposed communications equipment used for the
reception of information for the missiles, navigation or
communications. This will result in the ARSHIP 's inability
to target and launch missiles in an efficient manner and
hinder its ability to radio other vessels.
Random firing at the target may or may not strike
vital equipment, but the psychological effects can
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accomplish a strategic result. Boat attacks can drive the
ARSHIP from its present location as it maneuvers to avoid
the actions of an aggressor.
3. Mitigating Factors
Aggressor Considerations: The skill required to
operate a boat is possessed by any individual willing to do
so. No formal or special training is required for smaller
vessels but some commercial boats may require licenses.
Unlike the driver of the boat, the individuals operating
the weapons need to be properly trained. Some of the more
complex weapons and systems need more training compared to
firing small arms.
The only additional skills required, other than those
previously mentioned, are navigation and target
recognition. Electronic or "dead reckoning" navigation
requires skills that are not necessarily difficult but are
also not intuitive. Additionally, the individuals
targeting their weapons need to be able to identify vital
equipment on the ARSHIP. To be effective, they need to be
able to recognize vital equipment from non-vital appendages
onboard the vessel
.
Equipment choice, either the boat or the weapons,
depends on the aggressor's intention and resources. The
size of the boats available may govern the type of weapon
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or weapons the attackers can select to accomplish their
mission. The geographic area in which the ARSHIP is
targeted also influences the choice of boat size. If an
aggressor must travel out to sea for any great distance, a
larger boat may be needed. The boat will need to have fuel
capacity and sea-worthiness to transit the respective range
and operate in the conditions of an open ocean. Therefore,
the type of boats available to an aggressor will govern the
range at which the ARSHIP can be struck. The addition of
navigation and detection equipment will be required when
transiting large distances to locate and attack the ARSHIP.
The choice of boat and weapon may be dependent upon
the aggressor's ability to procure them. Small arms or
machine guns may not provide sufficient firepower to carry
out the task assigned. If the aggressors want to destroy
or damage a specific piece of equipment, they may require a
rocket or large caliber weapon. If a longer range or more
destructive weapon is necessary to achieve a desired
effect, an adversary may not have the necessary resources
to possess it. If this cannot be accomplished, an
alternate weapon or platform must be selected to accomplish
the same desired mission.
Environmental Considerations: The ability for a boat
to approach undetected is to the advantage of the
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aggressor. On the other hand, low visibility associated
with rain, fog, or snow, affects the adversary's weapon
performance due to their visual sighting characteristics.
Boat attacks may be attempted during the day or night
.
The advantage of a daylight attack is the ability of the
aggressor to see specific targets onboard the ARSHIP. The
disadvantages normally associated with overtly approaching
a target in daylight are countered by the aggressor boat's
ability to appear to be an innocent and non-threatening
vessel. Nighttime attacks add the ability to approach
visually undetected. Unfortunately, the ability to visually
identify critical nodes is also degraded. An attacker may
need to provide illumination with spotlights to locate
vital nodes.
The use of or lack of navigational lights plays in
favor of the attacking boats. By appearing to be what they
are not by using false navigational lights or not using
them at all, potential threats can appear to be innocent.
The reliance of U.S. Naval Ships on nighttime navigational
lights to classify ships can be used to the advantage of
the aggressor.
Sea state has the greatest effect on boat operations.
Smaller boats have difficulty operating when the sea state
rises. This can cause a boat to be unable to transit long
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distances out to sea or even result in it capsizing. A
higher sea state may require a larger boat to survive the
transit to the target. The pitching and rolling associated
with an increased sea state will affect the accuracy of
ballistic and fire-and-forget weapons. In addition, the
boat crew may lose their balance, fall and injure
themselves, or be swept overboard. Another factor
associated with a pitching and rolling boat is the
possibility of the crew getting seasick. This may render
them incapacitated and unable to conduct the operation.
Temperature also plays a role in a boat attack,
although to a lesser extent than other factors. Sea spray
from the boat combined with cold air temperatures can
effect exposed weapons. These weapons may then be rendered
inoperable or less effective than normal.
Defender Considerations: Readiness has been discussed
throughout this thesis. Associated issues to be recalled
include the alertness of the crew, the suspicions placed on
closing vessels, and the training of watchstanders
.
However,, in the case of boat attacks, the readiness of
topside weapons plays an integral part in ship defense.
Readying a .50 cal machine gun for action is a tedious
endeavor entailing "head spacing and timing, " not just
loading, pointing and pulling the trigger. Additional
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items, such as surface search radar and passive sonar, are
detection devices that must be monitored closely to
identify potential threats from unmarked or falsely marked
vessels
.
The design of the ARSHIP calls for it to have a
maximum sustained speed of 22 knots. Small boats possess
speeds greater than this, usually in the 3 0+ range. This
speed advantage gives the aggressor a tactical advantage
over the ARSHIP. The aggressor boats can maintain their
positioning relative to the target and maneuver around the
vessel
.
The distance from land the ARSHIP can loiter and
operate dictates the size and sea-worthiness of the
potential aggressor boats. This, therefore, can be used as
a deterrent measure by denying the aggressor boats access
to a target that is outside their maximum range.
4. Utility and Substitutability
Cost and Asset Availability: The training for a small
boat attack is minimal. The boat driver will need little
to no training. While the individuals using the weapons
will require training on the operation and targeting of
each weapon. The cost of training personnel associated for
a small boat attack is of little consequence to the
organization or group directing its employment. *
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Small boats are easily procured at a relatively low
cost. A greater expense is associated with the weapon
chosen for the mission. The availability of the weapons
may be high, as with small arms, or more challenging, as
with large caliber weapons, rockets, or torpedoes. Major
costs involved in boat attacks are accrued in procuring
more sophisticated boats. Boats such as commercial
fishing, shipping, or leisure boats are more expensive than
small inflatables or speedboats. Overall, the investment
of personnel and vessel is less when compared to that of a
war vessel.
Benefit: The amount of critical topside nodes on the
ARSHIP is limited. Antennas and crewmembers make up the
extent of critical nodes that can be destroyed with hand
held weapons. In the cases of collision or direct contact
detonation of high explosives, the boat attack has higher
effects against internal and structural critical nodes.
The operation may not damage or destroy the target, but the
attempt may alter the utilization of the ARSHIP in the
future. Tactically, the mission may or may not succeed,
but strategically, the desired effect may be obtained,
which will cause the ARSHIP to reposition through fear of
other boat attacks.
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The cost of the required equipment, boat and weapons,
and the possible effectiveness make the small boat option a
viable threat with high utility. The gains achieved
through the employment of a small boat attack outweigh the
losses or possible failure to accomplish a desired
objective.
E . AIRCRAFT
The term "aircraft" in this section encompasses
ultralites, gliders, and any private and commercial
airplanes and helicopters. This aircraft discussion will
concentrate on their use as a weapon against the ARSHIP and
not a delivery platform for other forces as discussed in
Section C.
1 . Modes
Like a boat attack that can approach without raising
suspicion, an aircraft must rely on this strategy to
approach the ARSHIP. An aircraft may seem non-threatening
if it is operating along established flight corridors.
Aircraft are primarily detected through electronic means by
U.S. naval warships, but an ultralite or glider is almost
undetectable by radar or electronic counter-measures (ECM)
.
These small, lightweight planes have minimal to no radar
signature due to the use of composite material such as
aluminum, canvas, and fiberglass. The ability to fly low
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and slow allows smaller aircraft to operate below automated
detection thresholds of many air search radar. The ability
to approach the ARSHIP in a non- threatening manner is an
integral element necessary to close within range to utilize
on-board weapons. In addition, many air defense missiles
will not home in on an aircraft with little or no radar or
infrared signature. An additional platform would need to
be utilized to launch an aircraft for open ocean attack.
Aircraft, such as ultralites, gliders, RPVs , and private
and commercial planes, can also operate as a weapon, again
by performing kamikaze missions on the target. Loaded with
explosives, the plane can become a guided warhead. A small
ultralite can be built from a relatively inexpensive kit
and requires minimal skills to operate. A glider
constructed of wood or composite material can operate
undetected by electronic means. Like ultralites and
gliders, a RPV can be constructed at a low cost and is hard
to detect with electronic and visual means. A RPV as a
weapon does not require a pilot onboard.
2. Objective
Once within range, the aircraft can be used as a
flying warhead or to launch ordnance to accomplish its
mission. The mission's goals and critical targets on the
ARSHIP are similar to those of a boat attack. The
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differences lie in how they are conducted. As a weapon,
the plane can be loaded with explosives that detonate upon
impact on the ARSHIP. Historically, this kamikaze style
mission has proven to be an effective weapon as seen in
WWII. It eliminates equipment and personnel without
discrimination, and is a crude weapon compared to smart
munitions. The fuel carried by the plane can also cause
secondary explosions and fires on the ARSHIP.
In its role of launching ordnance, the size of the
plane will dictate the amount and type of munitions it can
carry. The munitions can be bullets, torpedoes, bombs,
missiles, or a combination of some or all of them. Bullets
can be used to repeatedly strafe the ARSHIP damaging or
destroying vital equipment and the crew. This method may
not have as much precision as other munitions, but it can
be effective.
Bombs can have proximity fuses, which detonate the
bomb above deck inflicting damage to anything topside.
They may explode on contact with the deck with similar
results. Additionally, shaped charge bombs can penetrate
the deck to a lower part of the vessel and explode in the
interior of the ARSHIP. The results of such an explosion
could be catastrophic to the vessel's survival. The large
circular area of probability of precision associated with a
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conventional bomb means the chance of a direct hit is not
as precise as a bomb that is guided to its target. Guided
munitions or laser guided bombs (LGB) can receive terminal
guidance information through an electromagnetic link. This
ability was displayed during the Gulf War when U.S.
warplanes made precision missile attacks against Iraqi
targets. The stealth characteristics of the ARSHIP do not
combat such guidance systems. LGBs can be dropped from
larger platforms such as commercial aircraft.
3. Mitigating Factors
Aggressor Considerations: The ability to fly an
aircraft depends on the technology associated with it. The
skill required to fly an ultralite is minimal and training
can be at a low level. The more advanced an aircraft is,
the more training required to fly it skillfully. The
skills needed for advanced aircraft make these pilots and
aircraft unfavorable choices for suicide type missions. A
trained pilot is an asset not easily wasted by an
aggressor.
The choice of airframe depends on the aggressor's
economical means and accessibility to aircraft. The
aggressor may not have the financial ability to purchase a
large private or commercial aircraft. Smaller planes may
be all they can afford. The ultralite is not suited to
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carry large munitions, but it can be fitted with explosives
or the pilot can carry hand grenades. Grenades can be
effective as demolition of topside equipment, attrition of
topside security forces, and "Thermite" grenades can be
dropped on the VLS tubes and burn into the missiles from
above. In the role as a guided warhead, the ultralite can
fly low and slow toward the target to avoid detection.
Accessibility is not a significant issue if the
adversary can afford it. The problem arises when the
aggressor's objectives require an aircraft that cannot be
obtained. His plans must include aircraft that can be
procured and maintained.
Environmental Considerations: Visibility affects the
ability of the pilots flying small aircraft to locate the
ARSHIP. Smaller aircraft rely on the pilot to visually
locate the target and position for attack. Visibility is
an important factor to conduct aircraft attacks with planes
that are not technologically advanced.
Aircraft attacks can be attempted day or night. The
target must be well lit to distinguish it from nearby
vessels. Effective night attacks at sea are limited to
when the aggressor has the ability to identify the ARSHIP
from other vessels and obstructions. Daylight greatly aids
in locating and attacking the ARSHIP from the air.
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Precipitation and winds associated with bad weather
can conceal the approach of an aircraft. The plane must be
equipped with navigation equipment and the ARSHIP must be
in a known location and diverging from its last known
position slowly. The same weather that conceals the
aircraft's approach makes it harder to locate and attack
the ARSHIP. High winds can make it impossible for the
aircraft to fly and interfere with its navigation. Head
winds can reduce the aircraft's range and may render it
incapable of reaching the ARSHIP.
Defender Considerations: To understand the
implications of readiness and positioning, refer to the
discussion of these issues of the ARSHIP in the previous
chapter.
The speed of advance for the ARSHIP decreases the hit
probability of conventional bombs, but a plane intent on
crashing into the ARSHIP with explosives will be
unaffected. In addition, a plane must have the range to
attack the ARSHIP if it is in the open ocean. A small
aircraft, does not have the capability to attack across a
large expanse of water.
4 . Utility and Substitutability-
Cost and Asset Availability: The availability of
trained pilots depends on the type of aircraft that is to
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be used for the attack. Training a pilot to use a more
advanced plane will cost more than for a smaller plane that
can utilize a pilot with lesser skills.
Aircraft are relatively expensive. Therefore, the
cost is dependent on the aircraft used. The option to use
a small aircraft such as an ultralite would reduce cost.
These types of planes can be ordered and built from a kit
at a relatively low cost to the aggressor, whereas,
commercial jets can range into the millions. Commercial
aircraft are more likely to be rented, commissioned, or
hijacked for such a mission.
Benefit: The benefits are similar to those of a boat
attack, but the difference lies in the speed an aircraft
can operate and its method of approaching the ARSHIP in a
non- threatening manner. The aircraft's speed gives the
ARSHIP less time to react to an attack. In addition, the
ship may not pay attention to air contacts if it has to
track and maneuver constantly to avoid possible collisions
with surface contacts in confined water. Overall, if an
air contact can approach the ARSHIP via commercial or
leisure flight corridors, it has a higher potential of
sneaking up and swiftly striking the ARSHIP than boats.
This is a likely scenario and is most effective in confined




After the discussion in the previous section, the
question that remains to be answered is whether or not
there is a way for an Arsenal Ship, with reduced manning
and meager self-defenses, to counter an unconventional
threat. There are both, strategic and tactical, defense
measures that the ARSHIP can employ to deter, defend
against, or lessen the effects of the above threats. A
strategic defense measure is one that requires changes
beyond the organic assets of the vessel. Strategic defense
options affect the ARSHIP' s CONOPS and political and naval
strategies for its employment. A tactical defense measure
is one used by the ARSHIP itself for self-defense.
Tactical defense measures will influence the design of the
ARSHIP. Some of these defense measures will enhance the
defenses against conventional warfare threats as well.
B. STRATEGIC DEFENSE OPTIONS
Strategic defense options for this technological
target are based in psychological operations (PSYOP) and
deception, two actions of warfare that doctrinally fall
under special operations in the United States. An option
in this category is the use of phantom ships, created
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electronically or physically, to deter, confuse, distract,
or ambush the forces operating against the ARSHIP. The
physical phantom ships can be constructed with an
inexpensive and buoyant material such as wood, fiberglass,
plastic, foam, or rubber. This can and should be augmented
with radar and infrared reflectors and an additional
infrared (IR) source. Deterrence, the first possible
method of conducting conflict resolution in this case,
takes two forms . Phantom ships could introduce a false
number of ARSHIPs to the operating environment. This
action can keep the opponent from attacking because of the
perceived decreased probability of kill due to the numbers
of ARSHIPs present. By presenting a larger than truthful
number of targets the ARSHIP' s probability of survival
automatically increases. Quite simply, the opponent does
not foresee that enough damage will be inflicted to the
ARSHIP armada to affect the overall outcome of conflict,
and the ARSHIP merely becomes a target of opportunity when
it presents itself.
The second form of possible deterrence by this course
of action would be to generate false escort ships, giving
the impression that the ARSHIP is a well-defended target.
The perception of escort combatants will lessen the chance
of the ARSHIP appearing as an easy target. Unfortunately,
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the use of false escorts will counter actions and
technology utilized to hide the ARSHIP.
When considering the effect of these false ships,
there are psychological effects that come to light. The
first effect is produced by using these ships as a means to
dissuade the enemy from contemplating or executing an
attack. Essentially, these false ships will act as weapons
sinks that draw off an enemy's weapon system or confuse his
ability to discriminate between the false targets and the
ARSHIP. The psychological effects of distraction and
confusion can cause an adverse psychological effect on
opposing forces. The forces conducting the attack will
interpret their efforts as wasteful and more risky. This
not only affects those forces ' operating directly against
the ARSHIP, but also on the operational and strategic
planners. Across this spectrum, the feeling of inadequacy
caused by second guessing and internal dissension can exact
high tolls on the upper echelon of leadership.
The last application of these phantom ships is for
ambush. Reminiscent of past actions on the high seas, the
Q-ships of WWI looked like regular merchant vessels and
were employed to entice German U-boats . Once the U-boats
surfaced to engage the x ill-defended merchant', the Q-ship
would drop its facade with deadly results. The Q-ships
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were designed and equipped with enough firepower to destroy
a submarine attacking on the surface. This type of PSYOP
had a wide range of effects. In addition to eliminating
the attacking adversary, it demoralized the enemy's forces.
Operationally, one successful ambush by a false ARSHIP
would cause a reshaping of tactics employed against the
ARSHIP. In the case of the Q-ships, it led to German U-
boats only conducting submerged attacks, thus lowering
their success rate. Strategically, a successful ambush
could lead to questioning the utility of attacks against
the ARSHIP or which assets to employ.
C. TACTICAL DEFENSE OPTIONS
1. CONOPS
By addressing the ARSHIP' s CONOPS and making changes
to its proposed geographic operating areas the ARSHIP can
effectively lessen attacks from smaller air and boat
threats. Placing the ARSHIP 75-100 miles from land, this
can exclude small gunboat and inflatable boat attacks due
to their range limitations. The 75-100 mile range distance
from land only moves the ARSHIP to sea by 10% of the total
effective range of cruise missiles. This does not,
however, exclude aircraft dropped small boats or larger
boats but does lessen the threat from a certain target set.
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This distance from land also places the ARSHIP away from
normal air traffic lanes. Its reduces the likelihood of an
air threat diverting from a 'normal' track and attacking
without being noticed in a timely manner and countered.
Even, when not expecting attack or without indications
of a potential boarding the ARSHIP should travel at speeds
above 20 knots. These speeds effect the wind over the
topside of the decks, making helicopter boardings slightly
more hazardous and make small boat boardings more difficult
because of the hull wake.
The consideration of escort ships and/or fast attack
boats could be considered as deterrents and defense
platforms augmenting the ARSHIP' s meager defenses.
However, these counter the stealth capabilities of the
ARSHIP. The escorts, by their necessity to be near the
ARSHIP to extend their defensive umbrella, will give away
the area of operations of the ARSHIP.
2. Gun Mounts and Missile Platforms
Along with the strategic options, several tactical
defense options must be considered for self-defense. The
addition of gun mounts and platforms for the firing of
shoulder fired missiles can be used to defend against many
of the unconventional threats. The gun mounts should
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accommodate M-60, .50 caliber, or Vulcan chain machine
guns. These machine guns, with their high caliber, long
range, and high rates of fire, can be used to repel a
surface combat swimmer, an assault force, a small boat, and
slow aircraft attack. The missile platforms can be used to
fire RPGs , shoulder-fired air defense missiles, or
recoilless rifles. The tradeoff considered in external
mounts is the expansion of the ARSHIP's radar cross
section. The mounts and platforms can be retractable to
reduce radar returns and maintain the stealth
characteristics of the ARSHIP concept.
3 . Crew
With a reduced crew size, everyone aboard the ARSHIP
must become an integral part Of the ship's self defense
force. The armory should be stocked for all options. Its
inventory should include pistols, automatic rifles,
shotguns, body armor, concussion, illumination and chemical
grenades, 40mm grenade launchers, RPGs, AT-4s, and
Stingers. Proper training is required of all crewmembers
to become efficient on all weapons. The range of possible
threats warrants additional training, not only in weapon
proficiency, but also against unconventional tactics. The
U.S. Navy SEALS, who are trained in forcible boarding,
search, and seizure of water vessels can teach counter
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tactics. A properly trained and manned crew is a must to
defend the ARSHIP from the surface and air threats.
4 . Detection Equipment
To detect approaching threats, supplementary equipment
may be needed. The addition of large sensor equipment
systems such as active sonar may not be feasible. However,
remotely operated cameras would assist in visual detection
and isolation of threats. A single individual can monitor
the camera system to observe the topside spaces, ship's
sides, and the water adjacent to the ARSHIP. Forward
looking infrared (FLIR) cameras and other forms of night
vision technology are essential to help reduce the threat
of night attack. Additionally, there must be a real time
link to overhead sensors and companion vessels that may
detect threats over the horizon from the ARSHIP to allow
for proper warning.
5. Communications
Communications plays a key role in the effective
employment of the ARSHIP. Some defensive options along
these lines will be discussed under the section titled
"deceptive options." One additional consideration beyond
the automated communications system is the use of a phased
array antenna built into the structure of the ship. More
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conventional considerations have already taken into account
link margin and protection of EHF SATCOM.
6 . Deceptive Options
Other possible tactical defense options rely on
deception. Similar in thought to the strategic use, the
tactical use of deception will be to nullify the attack on
the ARSHIP. The application of a visual form of
camouflage, reminiscent of the paint schemes used on World
War II warships, can be applied to the ARSHIP without
altering the stealth properties gained through technology.
Due to the dependence of special operations forces on
visual identification, the paint schemes can aid in the
ability of the ARSHIP to elude or deceive visual detection.
The paint can camouflage the vessel with the surrounding
sea or make it appear as another ship, such as a commercial
or leisure vessel. To bolster the effects of deceptive
paint, the use of false targets onboard the ARSHIP can be
utilized.
Deceptive superstructure or equipment in conjunction
with camouflage could effectively distract enemy fire from
vital equipment and spaces . Dummy targets could include
high profile antennas and communications equipment,
superstructure for the operations of ship's maneuvering or
crew berthing, and false weapon systems. Likewise, false
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weapon systems on the deck to deceive an adversary could
also deter a possible attack from special operations forces
due to perceived self-defense capabilities. Again, the
trade off between the technology of stealth and the
possible radar signature of adding false structures to the
ARSHIP must be evaluated.
7 . Inport Defense
The ARSHIP is extremely vulnerable when inport.
Defensive measures that can thwart the combat swimmer are
fishing nets with audible or visible warnings, active
sonar, active suctions and discharges, high speed currents,
mammals, and active patrol boats. Each pose their own
strengths and weaknesses. Nets in the water need to
provide a barrier that the divers cannot sneak under or cut
through without activating the warning devices. These nets
will also need to be deployed and recovered every time the
ARSHIP leaves and returns to port. The nets also must be
maintained and checked often. The other options have been
touched on in Section A of Chapter IV.
One additional method of defending against the combat
swimmer operation is to utilize concussion grenades over
the side of the ship to over-pressure the water and the
semi -permeable cavities of the divers. This is effective,
but only when the divers are near the ship. This use of
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grenades excludes the use of trained mammals for swimmer
defense.
D . SUMMARY
The ARSHIP will be engineered for stealth against
electronic detection and classification. The proposed low
cost tactical defensive measures are vital to the
enhancement of its defense capabilities achieved through
technology.
This thesis has proposed that the ARSHIP is most
vulnerable during times of relative peace and at long
distances from perceived threats. Chapter III proposed
that the ARSHIP, due to its strategic importance in a
conflict, is a prime target for preventative and preemptive
attacks. Due to the ARSHIP' s dependence on technological
'hiding' and not on defensive firepower, potential
attackers must not be allowed to approach it within weapon
release range. Of primary importance, is the ARSHIP 's
reliance on Joint Vision 2010
'
s concept of full dimensional
protection. Historically, the United States' military has
been caught off guard, at home and abroad. This can be
seen from the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Marine barracks
in Beirut, and more recently, the Kobar Towers in Saudi
Arabia. Special operations have the ability to strike
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without warning and at long distances. The United States'
opponents will utilize this option in the future.
Additionally, special operations will be utilized
under conditions of singularity. When all other
conventional attempts against the ARSHIP have failed or the
means to face the ARSHIP conventionally are not available
to the adversary, conventional operations will be ceased
and give way to innovative special operations. These
operations will be more clandestine, illusive, and most
likely more successful. Their success will stem from the
cognitive bias of the conventional naval warrior and the
innovative spirit of the aggressor.
This thesis has shown the viability of possible
unconventional threats that must be addressed in making the
ARSHIP concept a successful reality. Any group or
organization, which feels threatened by U.S. foreign policy
and its implementation of the ARSHIP, may acquire the means
to attack the ARSHIP via special operations. Conventional
thinking, which dictates platform design and utilization,
must adapt to a world in which unconventional threats to
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